The Concept of Truth as Necessary in the Conception of Knowledge

Abstract

Truth is a concept that has been widely studied in the philosophical sphere, but on which today’s world, in which a subjectivist stance towards truth is increasingly assumed and which is experiencing the effects of this, calls for a new reflection. Precisely, one of the fundamental questions about truth that requires special attention refers to why it is important to guarantee it, a question that can be approached from the notion of knowledge, since, whatever the precise way in which it is defined, this definition depends on a basic conception of truth. From this, it is possible to ask how certain authors show the need for this concept. Considering the above, the question that motivates this article refers to whether the concept of truth is necessary or not in the concept of knowledge. Seeking to give an answer, the paper addresses the approaches of authors such as Plato and Nietzsche, related to the way they understand truth, knowledge and reality, but, mainly, to the possibility that the concept of truth is necessary in the conception of knowledge; concluding with an answer with which it is intended to show why it is possible to affirm that the concept of truth is required for the knowledge of reality.